RA08

PALESTINE & THE CREATION OF ISRAEL

Documents, Statehood and Displacement

COMPLETE SOURCE-BASED STUDY

A source-based comparison of mandate, war, displacement and Beter's explanations.

1917–1949 · national home · partition · Nakba · armistices

Tempus omnia revelat.

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Contents

What this volume examines 3
Method, terminology and source access 4
01 · A country before the new state 5
02 · Wartime promises and imperial bargains 6
03 · Balfour: read the whole short letter 7
04 · Mandate: administration, agency and rights 8
05 · Local inhabitants as political actors 9
06 · Population, land parcels and sovereignty 10
07 · Revolt, repression and the Peel proposal 11
08 · The 1939 White Paper 12
09 · Holocaust survivors and restricted options 13
10 · From recommendations to UN alternatives 14
11 · Resolution 181: more than two colours 15
12 · Acceptance, rejection and failed implementation 16
13 · Washington and Moscow: policy over time 17
14 · Plan Dalet: the actual text and the wider dispute 18
15 · Deir Yassin: an event and a reported number 19
16 · 14 May: declaration and recognition 20
17 · War, truces and foreign arms 21
18 · Nakba: flight, expulsion and blocked return 22
19 · Numbers, destitution and humanitarian testimony 23
20 · Bernadotte, return and Resolution 194 24
21 · 1949: armistice is not final peace 25
22 · 1950 aftermath: absence is not abandonment 26
23 · Beter: historical elements and an unsupported connection 27
24 · Conclusion: a state emerged, people’s questions remained 28
Reading maps: five layers, five questions 29
Claim register · C01–C05 30
Claim register · C06–C10 31
Chronology · 1 32
Chronology · 2 33
Glossary 34
Source register · S01–S05 35
Source register · S06–S10 36
Source register · S11–S15 37
Source register · S16–S20 38
Source register · S21–S25 39
Source register · S26–S30 40
Source register · S31–S34 41
Reader checklist and edition information 42

What this volume examines

RA08 follows the path from late Ottoman administration and wartime agreements to the British mandate, partition proposals, Israel’s establishment and Palestinian displacement. Its focus is 1917–1949. A historical 1950 statute is an explicitly marked property-law aftermath, not an entry into present-day legal advice.

The approach reads specific documents together with their limitations. A national programme, legal norm, diplomatic recognition, military control and a homeowner’s fate are not the same event. Moving between them requires more than an arrow on a timeline: the actual change must be established.

The inquiry includes the Jewish need for safety after persecution and Palestinian demands for self-determination and home. The sources contain profound disputes over legitimacy and methods. No identity, historical connection or experience of suffering establishes every organisation’s innocence or every member of another community’s guilt. [S07, S09]

Beter enters as a later interpreter through selected transcripts of AL50 and AL67. His connections are compared with documented relationships, not treated as explanations already confirmed by Israel’s existence. Current conflicts remain reserved for a separate, dated RA12. [S32, S33]

> **Document, plan, control and human consequence: four different evidentiary questions.**

Method, terminology and source access

The primary layer consists of available transcriptions of governmental texts, resolutions, diplomatic reports and a military plan. A historiographical review and a Red Cross archival study address questions a single official document cannot settle. Entries S01–S34 specify the accessible material: complete short text, extract, translation or later scholarly interpretation.

This is not a fresh examination of every archive. UNSCOP is used indirectly through identified documents; the translation of Plan Dalet is not the complete set of operational orders. No independent village-by-village displacement register is claimed. Beter’s recordings have not been newly audited here. [S12, S15, S17]

Palestine is tied to a period and purpose: a geographical region, mandated territory or proposed political unit. In contemporary administrative texts, Palestinian could cover different inhabitants. In the displacement analysis we explicitly mean Palestinian Arabs. Yishuv denotes the Jewish community in Palestine, not all Jews worldwide. [S04, S06]

Translations and paraphrases in SK and EN are editorial, not authoritative legal translations. Documented, disputed and unproven mean different things. Equal human dignity and civilian protection form the ethical framework. This is identified as our evaluation, not the position of every contemporary actor.

> **A note in a diplomatic file can be an authentic record of an unverified report.**

01 / A country before the new state

The absence of one independent modern state must not be confused with the absence of a population. The 1946 official overview describes pre-war Palestine as divided among Ottoman administrative units, with an Arab Muslim majority and Christian and Jewish communities. This is a committee retrospective, not a complete social history. [S01]

Its geographical chapter describes ports, industry, citrus groves, terraces, olives and vineyards. It names Acre, Haifa, Tel Aviv, Jaffa and Gaza, and agricultural activity by Arabs and Jews. An empty-country image therefore fails even against this contemporary foreign committee’s account. [S06]

Urban ownership, peasant cultivation, pastoral use and nomadic mobility are not interchangeable. Sparsely built territory need not be empty or unused. A historian needs local records of ownership, cultivation and seasonal use, not merely a white space on a political map. [S06]

For the discussion that follows, the boundary is simple: new institutions did not create human life from nothing. Conversely, the presence of an Arab population does not erase Jewish communities or their historical connections. Both can be acknowledged without deriving an unlimited entitlement to domination. [S01, S06]

> **State boundaries are not the beginning of people’s history.**

02 / Wartime promises and imperial bargains

The 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement is concrete evidence of British and French power planning. Its text combines Arab states or a confederation with European economic priorities, areas of direct or indirect administration and a proposed international administration. Ports, railways and trade also feature. [S02]

This establishes imperial coordination by identified governments. It does not, without further evidence, establish a later unified design by every great power or a single family. The 1916 agreement, 1922 mandate and 1947 partition plan are different documents with different authors and purposes. [S02, S04, S13]

The committee’s historical overview also recalls British-Arab wartime promises and the dispute over their territorial reach. RA08 does not pretend to give a final independent ruling on every formulation in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. Here the identified official retrospective is used, not the complete original correspondence. [S01]

The analytical question is not simply whether the powers reached an agreement with each other. It is also what place was given to the inhabitants whose territory was being allocated. Agreement among powerful states and local consent are not the same kind of legitimacy.

> **Documented negotiations by named governments need no transformation into an unknowable, all-powerful secret centre.**

03 / Balfour: read the whole short letter

The letter of 2 November 1917 to Lord Rothschild expressed British governmental support for a Jewish national home in Palestine. Its wording did not give the whole country to the addressee. Receiving a political letter is not the same as receiving title to property. [S03]

It also included two different safeguards: the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and the rights and political status of Jews elsewhere. The asymmetry is visible in the text itself. Local non-Jewish communities are not given a comparable national-political pledge. [S03]

The British explanation of 1922 explicitly rejected the idea that all Palestine would become exclusively Jewish or that Arab inhabitants should disappear or become subordinate. Yet this was a governmental interpretation of an undertaking, not evidence that conflicting interests had been practically reconciled. [S05]

Source criticism therefore requires neither a private-gift myth nor denial of the letter’s major political effect. The real question is how a promise of one national future related to the rights and political will of the rest of the population.

> **Letter addressee ≠ territory owner. A rights pledge ≠ its implementation.**

04 / Mandate: administration, agency and rights

The mandate approved on 24 July 1922 gave Britain extensive legislative and administrative powers. Article 2 linked the Jewish national home, development of self-governing institutions and protection of inhabitants' civil and religious rights. This was more than a diplomatic slogan: it created an institutional framework. [S04]

Article 4 recognised a Jewish agency as a public body cooperating with the administration. Article 6 envisaged facilitating Jewish immigration and settlement while safeguarding the rights and position of other population groups. Both the enabling provision and its limitation must be read, rather than selecting only one half. [S04]

East of the Jordan, Article 25 allowed certain provisions to be withheld with the League Council's consent. The outline of the broader mandated territory therefore cannot be transferred to every subsequent map of the national home or state without a chronological and legal explanation. [S04]

The analysis distinguishes formal international authorisation from local political representation. An equality clause alone does not answer who decided immigration policy or the future majority. That gap must be followed in political practice, not resolved by citing a legal title.

> **A legal framework explains powers; it does not automatically explain the consent of the governed.**

05 / Local inhabitants as political actors

The committee’s 1946 chapter on Arab attitudes records demands for independent government and opposition to postponing independence until altered population proportions permitted a different political arrangement. It associates these objections with both Arab Muslim and Christian representatives. [S07]

It also records the argument that Palestinian Arabs had not caused Europe’s persecution of Jews and should not alone bear the consequences of Western immigration restrictions. This is a specific contemporary argument, not an excuse invented after the war. Its existence does not exclude other positions or violent acts by particular actors. [S07]

The committee itself also uses sweeping cultural language that can distort its description. Citing an official report does not mean adopting its stereotypes. What it records as witnesses’ objections is separated from its own civilisational judgements. [S07]

It is equally wrong to identify every Jewish inhabitant with one party or every Palestinian inhabitant with one delegation’s decision. A collective political objective, a representative mandate and individual responsibility are three questions. Opposition to a programme must be examined through its actual content and methods.

> **People are not merely percentages on someone else’s proposed map.**

06 / Population, land parcels and sovereignty

Popular maps often confuse three quantities: population share, private ownership and the proposed territory of a state. One cannot be directly calculated from another. An ownership map does not identify every tenant, and a political-control map is not a land register.

Even a numerical official transcription needs checking. Chapter IV of the committee report gives approximately 750,000 inhabitants and 84,000 Jews for 1922, but also states a 13 percent share. Arithmetically, 84,000 / 750,000 is 11.2 percent. The discrepancy is flagged; without the original statistical table, no independent correction of the historical record is claimed. [S06]

This is not new population research. It shows why this edition does not base a political verdict on an unchecked precise percentage. Other figures likewise require a date, territory, included groups and rounding method. Population changes cannot be read without immigration, births, deaths and departures. [S06]

A land purchase can be a valid transaction while still raising questions about tenants or political futures. Allocating state sovereignty does not automatically extinguish every private title. For a particular house or village, its own record must be read. [S13, S31]

> **A calculation exposes an inconsistency; it does not determine which original datum is correct.**

07 / Revolt, repression and the Peel proposal

The committee’s 1946 retrospective describes the general strike and revolt beginning in 1936. Arab demands included independence, a halt to Jewish immigration and restrictions on land transfers. The report also records violence and increasing British repression. [S01]

In 1937 the Peel Commission proposed partition. Arab representatives rejected it; the Zionist Congress opened the possibility of negotiation without accepting the proposed arrangement as a complete final settlement. RA08 uses the overview’s account, not an independent examination of every Peel Commission volume. [S01]

British organisational bans, deportations and military courts belong to the history of power as much as local movements’ programmes. The mandatory administration was not merely a passive referee between two communities. It had its own security and imperial priorities and instruments of coercion. [S01]

The historical task is to separate political demands from particular violent methods. The right to demand self-government does not excuse attacking a civilian. Conversely, condemning civilian violence does not remove the question of representation or colonial authorities’ responsibility for their own repressive acts.

> **An unaccepted 1937 proposal is neither a 1947 boundary nor the 1949 outcome.**

08 / The 1939 White Paper

The May 1939 White Paper rejected converting Palestine into a Jewish state and envisaged an independent Palestine within ten years, with Arab and Jewish participation in government. The text is not evidence that such a state came into being. It records British policy at a particular moment. [S08]

The immigration programme allowed 75,000 Jews over five years: a regular allocation of 50,000 and another 25,000 refugees under the document’s conditions. Subsequent immigration was to depend on Arab acquiescence. These were quotas and rules, not a table of actual arrivals. [S08]

As Nazi persecution intensified, barriers to entry had grave human significance. Palestinian fears of losing political majority were not identical to Europe’s responsibility for persecution. Expecting one limited territory to solve a wider refugee crisis carried its own inequitable asymmetry. [S07, S08, S09]

British policy therefore does not form a simple unchanging line from the 1917 letter to May 1948. Its shifts can be criticised from different positions, but cannot be omitted to make history appear the flawless execution of one permanent plan.

> **A quota is an administrative allowance, not a count of lives saved.**

09 / Holocaust survivors and restricted options

The USHMM account describes the extensive post-war displaced-persons crisis. Jewish survivors lived in camps in Germany, Austria and Italy; returning home could be impossible or dangerous. Palestine was a major destination for many, while others wanted to reach the United States or other countries. [S09]

This experience cannot be reduced to a propaganda pretext. At the same time, a political organisation speaking for refugees is not identical with every refugee. An individual need for safety and a particular territorial-political programme must be examined separately. [S09]

In 1946 the Anglo-American Committee recommended immediate admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. It also emphasised the wider world’s responsibility for refugees and rejected one community’s domination of the other. The recommendations show that safety and the political model were still being treated as multiple questions. [S10]

The ethical conclusion here has two parts that do not cancel each other out: survivors needed protection and a future; Palestinian civilians should not lose their homes in compensation for crimes committed elsewhere. Establishing the first does not refute the second.

> **Recognising one experience of suffering does not erase another.**

10 / From recommendations to UN alternatives

The year 1947 did not simply open a vote on one finished map. A US memorandum of 30 September discussed the UNSCOP majority proposal, economic viability and possible territorial changes. It also referred to a minority proposal and different voting options. It documents decision-making, not an already adopted resolution. [S12]

Proposed changes included assigning Jaffa to the Arab state as an enclave. Other contemplated changes concerned Safad and the south. Not every official suggestion became part of the final plan. Different proposals cannot be conflated simply because all bear the date 1947. [S12]

The memorandum also identified US strategic, economic and political interests and sought to prevent the outcome looking like a solely American plan. This is concrete evidence of political influence. It neither requires nor automatically supports an explanation based on individuals' ancestry. [S12]

The complete original UNSCOP volume is not treated as examined in this study. The accessible diplomatic document and subsequent adopted resolution are used instead. This limitation matters especially when comparing maps and precise population tables. [S12, S13]

> **A working proposal, a recommendation and an adopted text are not the same source.**

11 / Resolution 181: more than two colours

On 29 November 1947 the UN General Assembly recommended partition with economic union. The plan envisaged Arab and Jewish states and a special international regime for Jerusalem. It included transitional bodies, procedures and deadlines. Adoption did not mean immediate physical implementation of every component. [S13]

Its legal architecture also matters: religious freedom, equal rights and minority protections, provisions on property and economic cooperation. A coloured map without these elements makes the proposed arrangement a much simpler document than the one actually adopted. [S13]

Allocating political administration did not itself erase private ownership by people on the “other side”. A proposed state’s territory is not automatically the property of every member of a national group, and becoming a minority does not automatically mean losing civil rights. [S13]

Evaluation must consider international approval, local consent and enforceability together. Support for the resolution did not guarantee the ability to enforce its protective provisions. Failure of implementation does not mean the document never existed or changed nothing politically.

> **The plan included rights and institutions, not merely area.**

12 / Acceptance, rejection and failed implementation

The scholarly war review distinguishes a civil phase from late 1947 and the later conflict involving neighbouring states. The Jewish community’s political leadership accepted partition as a basis for statehood, while Arab leaderships opposed it. This distinction matters, but is not a complete account of every wartime decision. [S17]

Rejection must be explained through opponents’ objections, not solely through the subsequent outcome. Arab arguments about self-determination and feared political subordination were recorded before the vote. This does not make every detail automatically correct or excuse violence. [S07]

Likewise, acceptance does not prove every later military act by the plan’s supporters complied with it. Minority-rights and property provisions remain a separate standard. Political agreement with partition cannot substitute for examination of a particular expulsion or attack. [S13]

Failure to reach the planned arrangement involved weak international implementation, the mandatory power’s departure and local armed decisions. A civilian does not lose protection because a representative voted wrongly, rejected negotiations or lost a war. That last statement is our ethical criterion, not a description of every contemporary practice. [S14, S17]

> **A delegation’s position is not the individual guilt of everyone it purportedly represents.**

13 / Washington and Moscow: policy over time

In his speech of 14 May 1947, available as FRUS extracts, Gromyko referred to the legitimate interests of Jews and Arabs. He preferred a joint democratic state and allowed partition if coexistence within one state proved impossible. The text does not express unchanging support for one solution across all periods. [S11]

The September 1947 US memorandum considered supporting partition with changes. Yet on 25 March 1948 Truman proposed temporary trusteeship because partition had not been peacefully implemented. Recognition in May cannot therefore be projected backwards to erase the March proposal. [S12, S14, S19]

Soviet support for partition and Czechoslovak arms supplies cannot be omitted. US reports record them, and Israeli representatives later acknowledged the purchases. The much stronger idea that these steps establish permanent joint command over everyone involved remains a different claim. [S20, S21]

External assistance can be crucial without creating complete political subordination. Each relationship requires a date, transaction, interest and decision-making authority. Later hostility does not disprove earlier cooperation; earlier cooperation does not establish an eternal alliance.

> **Relationships have dates. They are not inherited properties of peoples.**

14 / Plan Dalet: the actual text and the wider dispute

The general part of Plan Dalet, dated 10 March 1948, addresses control of the territory designated for the Jewish state and protection of Jewish settlements beyond it. As a military document it deals with communications, garrisons and enemy bases. A one-word label cannot replace reading it. [S15]

Its provisions on villages nevertheless contain real coercion: destroying places that could not be permanently controlled and, where resistance occurred, expelling the population beyond the state’s borders. Where resistance was absent, a different branch envisaged disarmament, garrisons and intervention in local administration. Neither the violent branch nor the different conditions can be omitted. [S15]

Whether this constituted a general plan to expel every Palestinian is a broader question than the existence of one clause. Picaudou’s historiographical review identifies disputes over intent, scope and local implementation. Extensive displacement and specific expulsions are not disproved by historians’ disagreement over one formulation of central intent. [S17]

This edition uses the translated general plan. The web edition lacks the complete operational Appendix C and does not establish the course of every action. A stronger local conclusion requires an order, its recipient, an implementation report and affected people’s testimony. [S15]

> **A conditional expulsion clause is real; its overall implementation is a further question.**

15 / Deir Yassin: an event and a reported number

Consul Wasson’s telegram of 13 April 1948 reports the attack on Deir Yassin on 9 April. It identifies Irgun and the Stern group, also known as Lehi, as the attackers. The source belongs to the contemporary evidence of civilian killing, not a later invented event. [S16]

The telegram also gives 250 dead and other information relayed from statements at the time. RA08 explicitly labels 250 a contemporary reported figure, not a final toll independently verified by us. A name-by-name audit absent from the document is not attributed to the diplomat. [S16]

Distinguishing the quality of numbers does not relativise a massacre. Precision is especially important for grave violence: an exaggerated or unverified toll can be exploited to deny the event, whereas changing the count does not itself remove responsibility for killing a person.

To assess the attack’s effect on later flight, the event, circulation of reports and particular communities’ responses must be separated. One telegram does not measure an entire population’s fear. Yet flight from armed violence cannot reasonably be reduced to freely surrendering a home. [S16, S17]

> **An authentic telegram is not automatically an accurate final total.**

16 / 14 May: declaration and recognition

The declaration of 14 May 1948 proclaimed the State of Israel and linked its institutions' operation to the mandate's termination. Its historical preamble presents the authors' case: Jewish connections to the land, persecution, the Holocaust and the UN decision. This is the position of a founding political document, not a neutral encyclopaedia. [S18]

The text promises social and political equality without distinction of religion, race or sex and addresses Arab inhabitants as well. Those sentences should be reported, not omitted. They cannot serve as a shortcut proving that every later measure was equal and voluntarily accepted. [S18]

Truman's short statement that day recognised the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new state. Recognising a government, fixing exact boundaries, determining everyone's citizenship and deciding title to every parcel are not identical acts. One document did not resolve all four questions. [S19]

Statehood is therefore not analysed as one magical instant. Proclamation matters, but institutions, military survival, international relations and consequences for inhabitants must be examined alongside it. The Palestinian Arab state envisaged by Resolution 181 did not emerge in the same way or on the planned timetable. [S13, S18, S29]

> **A declaration of statehood is neither a land register nor a peace treaty.**

17 / War, truces and foreign arms

After the mandate ended, intervention by neighbouring Arab states' armies expanded the conflict. The war had an earlier local phase; it did not begin without a past on 15 May. The entry of regular armies nevertheless changed its scale and the decisions of Israeli and Arab actors. [S17, S20]

The CIA report of 27 July 1948 assessed the strengthening of Israeli military capacity during the first truce and subsequent changes in control. It is a contemporary estimate with forecasts, not an omniscient retrospective. Statements about Soviet intentions are identified as US intelligence assessments. [S20]

A US conversation record of 14 December captures Israeli representatives' acknowledgement of buying weapons in Czechoslovakia. This is specific evidence of a supply relationship. It is not, by itself, evidence of ancestry, a common religious programme or complete dependence of Israeli decisions on Moscow. [S21]

Arab states likewise had their own goals and disagreements. The historiographical review shows why they cannot be replaced with a single actor pursuing one unified plan. Analysis must distinguish governments, armies, local organisations and civilians whom all could place in danger. [S17]

> **A real arms transaction needs no myth of shared ancestry.**

18 / Nakba: flight, expulsion and blocked return

The Palestinian Nakba names the catastrophe associated with war, extensive displacement and the destruction of much of the preceding social world. Its existence does not depend on historians agreeing on a single model of intent. Disagreement over explanation must not be used to deny documented displacement. [S17, S22]

Historiography distinguishes flight from fighting and fear, local institutional collapse, direct expulsions and later obstruction of return. Their relative importance differed by place and time. Lydda and Ramla in July 1948 are central cases in the expulsion debate; this edition uses a scholarly review, not newly examined operational archives for both towns. [S17]

Ethridge’s diplomatic assessment of February 1949 referred to 700,000 homeless people and identified several mechanisms of departure, including force and fear. It is not a complete village database. It nevertheless conflicts with a blanket claim that everyone departed voluntarily and permanently surrendered their property. [S22]

Departure creates a further decision: who may return? The cause of initial flight and later prevention of return may involve different actors. An analysis ending with whether someone left before troops arrived omits a major part of their loss. [S22, S25, S26]

> **Leaving in fear is not the same as consenting to permanent dispossession.**

19 / Numbers, destitution and humanitarian testimony

Refugee reports have a date, geographical coverage and purpose. Bernadotte’s September assessment and Ethridge’s February estimate were not produced at the same moment and should not be treated as interchangeable final censuses. Both the war and record-keeping changed in between. [S24, S22]

In her Red Cross archival study, Rey-Schyrr reproduces nurses’ reports from 1948. Descriptions of Ramallah and Gaza concern overcrowding, poverty, inadequate shelter and shortages. RA08 uses these as archival testimony transmitted through the study, not as our direct observation. [S23]

Assistance meant concrete needs: water, food, medical treatment, clothing and shelter. Registration in an aid system does not by itself determine ownership, citizenship or a final political future. A humanitarian category is not a complete identity. [S23, S30]

Protecting Jewish civilians and refugees is not counter-evidence against helping Palestinian civilians. Needs are not points in an argumentative contest. In both cases testimony, estimates and political proposals must be distinguished, and specific violence named without collective labels.

> **Humanitarian aid addresses destitution; it does not by itself resolve the loss of home and rights.**

20 / Bernadotte, return and Resolution 194

Bernadotte’s report of 16 September 1948 considered territorial arrangements, refugee return and compensation. Its proposals for Galilee, the Negev and Arab areas must not be silently converted into the adopted outcome. A mediator’s recommended map is another kind of document. [S24]

Paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 of 11 December 1948 concerns refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours. It envisages permitting return at the earliest practicable date and compensation for those not returning, as well as for property loss or damage. [S25]

The text assigns the Conciliation Commission tasks concerning repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation. It is therefore more than a promise of food aid. At the same time, this study does not provide a final legal ruling on every present-day claim or subsequent development. [S25]

The Lausanne diplomatic record of May 1949 shows that specific requests for return and protection remained under negotiation. A request’s presence in minutes does not establish its fulfilment. Evaluation must distinguish the declared principle from actual permissions and prohibitions. [S26]

> **Resolution, negotiation and actual return are three different steps.**

21 / 1949: armistice is not final peace

The Egyptian-Israeli agreement of 24 February 1949 expressly states that its armistice demarcation line is not a political or territorial boundary. The Jordanian-Israeli agreement of 3 April likewise leaves final arrangements open. Their military rules are real but have explicit textual limitations. [S27, S28]

The West Bank and Gaza did not become the independent Arab state envisaged by Resolution 181. The outcome involved Israeli control, Jordanian control in the West Bank and Egyptian control in Gaza; Jerusalem was divided. Division of the city did not implement the original international regime. [S13, S17, S27, S28]

A US map of 6 April 1949 from the Truman Papers combines a legend for territory proposed in 1947 with approximate Israeli control and armistice lines. It is useful precisely because it displays different layers. Its April date is not the date when every armistice had been completed. [S34, S29]

Bunche’s July conclusions after the armistices discuss a future political settlement. A map following the end of major operations is therefore neither a map of resolved personal rights nor automatically today’s map. A line can regulate troops while also dividing a field, a road or a family. [S29]

> **1947: proposal. April 1949: dated conditions. Armistice: not final settlement.**

22 / 1950 aftermath: absence is not abandonment

The historical Absentees' Property Law of March 1950 defines absence through conditions connected to a period beginning on 29 November 1947. Nationality, location or departure from normal residence could be relevant. It is not simply an everyday word for someone who cannot presently be found. [S31]

The statute provides for specified property to vest in the Custodian and also contains rules and possibilities for release. The existence of an exception or release mechanism does not establish that a particular owner recovered property. That would require the individual decision file. [S31]

This legal mechanism is not equivalent to a voluntary sale. Someone could flee fighting and later face a different legal barrier to return or managing property. Internal displacement also requires examination against the actual statutory conditions, not just an assumption that the person was or was not abroad. [S31]

RA08 is limited to the accessible English translation of the historical statute. It does not summarise every amendment or current judicial practice. Inclusion explains why war's consequences did not end with the shooting: a military change could continue through a changed legal regime for a house or parcel. [S31]

> **A property's statutory classification is not proof of its owner's consent.**

23 / Beter: historical elements and an unsupported connection

In AL50 of 1979, Beter connects his account of the Khazars to modern Zionism and Israel’s creation, placing the events of 1917 alongside each other. The transcript establishes that he argued this way. It does not establish genealogical and organisational continuity between a medieval khaganate and a modern state. [S32]

In AL67 he distinguishes American Jews from the leadership and policies he criticises. That matters for an accurate reading of the author. At the same time, broader claims of secretly interconnected leadership do not follow from the existence of diplomatic support or arms transactions. [S33]

RA08’s sources document British imperial power, international programmes, Jewish and Arab political organisations, specific armed violence and Czechoslovak assistance to Israel. These are real relationships with dates and content. An independent demonstration of one permanently directing “axis” has not been identified in them. [S02, S04, S13, S15, S16, S21]

The stronger claim would require identified participants, instructions, subsequent execution and evidence of continuity. A genealogy, religious label or two matching years cannot replace that chain. Responsibility for documented conduct does not disappear merely because Beter’s overall explanation has not been established.

> **Name actual conduct precisely; do not fill evidentiary gaps with collective guilt.**

24 / Conclusion: a state emerged, people’s questions remained

Israel’s emergence is a documented political and institutional outcome, not merely a story in Beter’s recordings. Palestinian displacement and unresolved return are also documented. Neither finding refutes the other or requires its omission. [S18, S19, S22, S25]

The chronology does not show one immutable proposal simply being carried out. It shows mandatory powers, competing political projects, shifts in great-power policy, war, changes of control and different property regimes. Decisions had identifiable authors and consequences. [S04, S12, S14, S27, S31]

Precision requires acknowledging religious and historical connections without genetic tests for human rights. Survivors’ safety does not excuse displacing others; injustice to Palestinians does not excuse violence against Jews. This is the study’s openly stated ethical conclusion, not the result of counting ancestors.

Further work should turn to local files, original map annexes, monetary and land records and multilingual testimony. RA08 is a completed first editorial edition with a bounded corpus, not the last word. The wider synthesis of Beter’s theory remains with RA11, and present events with RA12.

> **Evidentiary impartiality is not indifference to suffering.**

Reading maps: five layers, five questions

ADMINISTRATION: For an Ottoman or mandatory map, ask which institution and date it represents. An administrative district is not an ethnic ancestry census. East of the Jordan, particular provisions and subsequent developments matter, not merely the broader outline. [S01, S04]

PROPOSAL: The 1947 partition has the content of Resolution 181, including Jerusalem’s regime. A UNSCOP working proposal or a change suggested in a US memorandum can differ from the final text. The colour key must identify the version shown. [S12, S13]

CONTROL: The 6 April 1949 map in S34 combines proposed territory with approximate control on a specified day. It was visually inspected online; RA08 contains no copy. The source link lets readers inspect the whole legend. The schematic below is not a tracing of that map. [S34]

ARMISTICE AND PROPERTY: An armistice line can have an expressly provisional legal character. Ownership of a particular house is a further question. A political area cannot establish purchase, dispossession, consent or return without the relevant record. [S27, S28, S31]



No map discussed in this publication is represented as a present-day boundary.

Claim register / C01–C05

C01 · Before 1948 this was an empty country.

Contradicted by the consulted sources

The contemporary account records towns, agriculture and diverse communities. Absence of one independent state is not absence of people. [S01, S06]

C02 · Balfour gave Palestine to the Rothschilds.

Not established by the text

The political letter is addressed to Lord Rothschild, but is not a conveyance of the whole country. [S03]

C03 · Resolution 181 immediately created the final territorial order.

Proposal and outcome conflated

The recommended plan contained transitional steps. Control in 1949 and the armistices had a different form and legal limitations. [S13, S27, S28]

C04 · Plan Dalet contains no expulsion provision.

Contradicted by the translation

The general text contains a conditional expulsion clause where resistance occurred. Implementation and wider intent are further questions. [S15, S17]

C05 · Wasson’s telegram verifies a final toll of 250.

Incorrect evidentiary status

This is a contemporary relayed figure, not a name-by-name audit. RA08 does not establish an exact final toll. [S16]

Claim register / C06–C10

C06 · All Palestinian refugees voluntarily gave up their homes.

Contradicted by documented mechanisms

Sources distinguish force, fear, expulsion and barriers to return. Local causes require individual evidence. [S17, S22, S26]

C07 · Czechoslovak arms supplies are merely a legend.

Refuted by a specific record

The December 1948 record captures Israeli acknowledgement of purchases. It does not establish the broader claim of complete direction. [S21]

C08 · The 1949 armistices settled all boundaries and rights.

Contradicted by their provisions

The texts leave final questions open; refugee and property disputes continued. [S27, S28, S26, S31]

C09 · Property covered by the 1950 law was necessarily voluntarily sold.

Legal mechanisms conflated

Statutory classification and vesting in a custodian are not a sale contract. Any return requires documentation. [S31]

C10 · Events in 1917 and support in 1948 prove Beter’s permanent axis.

Not demonstrated in this corpus

Coincidence and a transaction do not establish joint command and thousand-year continuity. Identified decision-making evidence is needed. [S11, S21, S32, S33]

Chronology / 1

1916	Sykes-Picot agreement: imperial zones and transport interests. [S02]
2. 11. 1917	Balfour letter: support for a national home, two rights safeguards. [S03]
1922 / 1923	Mandate approved in July 1922; effective in 1923 according to the contemporary overview. [S04, S01]
1936–1939	Arab revolt, violence and British repression. [S01]
1937	Peel partition proposal; not a final adopted boundary. [S01]
1939	White Paper: a new British political and immigration programme. [S08]
1946	Anglo-American Committee: refugees, rights and recommendations. [S10]
14. 5. 1947	Gromyko: a joint state, or alternatively partition. [S11]
29. 11. 1947	Resolution 181: recommended partition with economic union. [S13]
10. 3. 1948	Plan Dalet: general text and conditional procedures. [S15]
25. 3. 1948	Truman’s proposal for temporary trusteeship. [S14]

> **All dates are historical; this chronology is not an account of the current conflict.**

Chronology / 2

9. / 13. 4. 1948	Deir Yassin; subsequent Wasson telegram. [S16]
14.–15. 5. 1948	Proclamation of Israel, end of the mandate and expansion of the war. [S18, S19, S20]
júl / July 1948	Lydda and Ramla: changes in control and extensive displacement. [S17, S20]
16. 9. 1948	Bernadotte report and recommendations on territory and refugees. [S24]
11. 12. 1948	Resolution 194: return, compensation and the Conciliation Commission. [S25]
24. 2. / 3. 4. 1949	Egyptian and Jordanian armistices with Israel. [S27, S28]
6. 4. 1949	Dated US military-situation map, not the complete final year. [S34]
21. 7. 1949	Bunche’s conclusions following the armistice agreements. [S29]
8. 12. 1949	Resolution 302: establishment of UNRWA. [S30]
14. 3. 1950	Absentees’ Property Law: an explicitly marked aftermath. [S31]

All dates are historical; this chronology is not an account of the current conflict.

Glossary

Jišuv / Yishuv
The Jewish community in Palestine, not a synonym for all Jews worldwide.

Národný domov / National home
A contemporary political term; its wording is not automatically identical with an exact later state boundary.

Mandát / Mandate
An internationally approved administrative framework. Its formal authorisation is not identical with local consent.

UNSCOP
The UN Special Committee on Palestine in 1947. Used indirectly in RA08 through identified documents.

Corpus separatum
A special international regime for Jerusalem under Resolution 181, not the city’s later division.

Hagana / Haganah
A Jewish military organisation; not interchangeable with Irgun, Lehi or the whole population.

Nakba
The Palestinian term for the catastrophe of war, displacement and loss of a social world, not just one battle.

De facto
Recognition of factual authority; its precise legal and diplomatic effect depends on the document’s context.

Prímerie / Armistice
An agreement governing cessation of military operations, not automatically final peace or a political boundary.

Správca / Custodian
The authority empowered under the historical Absentees’ Property Law, not simply a voluntarily chosen house manager.

Definitions are reading aids; consult the cited sources for precise provisions.

Source register / S01–S05

S01 · Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Appendix IV: Historical Background

1946 · Contemporary official retrospective, transcribed by Avalon. Selected passages on Ottoman administration, the mandate, the revolt and partition proposals. The committee’s interpretation is not an impartial voice for every inhabitant.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/angap04.asp

S02 · The Sykes-Picot Agreement

1916 · English transcription of the agreement: economic priorities, administrative zones and international administration. The original annexed map was not included in the consulted text or reproduced in RA08.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/sykes.asp

S03 · The Balfour Declaration

2 Nov 1917 · Complete short letter in the Avalon transcription. The addressee, the government’s declared support and the two formulations of rights are distinguished.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/balfour.asp

S04 · The Palestine Mandate

24 Jul 1922 · Text of the mandate, especially Articles 1–7, 15 and 25. A legal instrument of contemporary administration; the norm alone does not establish its implementation.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp

S05 · British White Paper of June 1922

Jun 1922 · Available transcription of the Churchill White Paper. Used for its limits on the meaning of the national home and its economic absorptive-capacity criterion.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brwh1922.asp

Access to the listed web editions: 11 October 2026. Identifying a source does not independently confirm every sentence in it.

Source register / S06–S10

S06 · Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Chapter IV: Geography and Economics

1946 · Chapter transcription, especially geography and population passages. One internal arithmetic inconsistency in the reported figures is explicitly not presented as a corrected historical datum.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/angch04.asp

S07 · Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Chapter VI: The Arab Attitude

1946 · An official account of testimony and attitudes, not a verbatim joint manifesto of all Arabs. Its own cultural stereotypes are not adopted.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/angch06.asp

S08 · British White Paper of 1939

May 1939 · Policy text, including constitutional, immigration and land provisions. The quota is distinguished from the actual number of people admitted.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brwh1939.asp

S09 · USHMM: Postwar Refugee Crisis and the Establishment of the State of Israel

historical museum overview · Museum historical account of Holocaust survivors, displaced persons and emigration. Not a separate demographic analysis of every refugee population.

https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/postwar-refugee-crisis-and-the-establishment-of-the-state-of-israel

S10 · Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Chapter I: Recommendations

1946 · Committee recommendations, including 100,000 entry certificates and rejection of one community’s domination of the other. A recommendation is not an implemented outcome.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/angch01.asp

Access to the listed web editions: 11 October 2026. Identifying a source does not independently confirm every sentence in it.

Source register / S11–S15

S11 · Gromyko speech at the United Nations, extracts; FRUS 1947 V, doc. 765

14 May 1947 · Published speech extracts in the US diplomatic edition. Preference for a joint state and conditional partition alternative; not the complete verbatim record of the meeting.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d765

S12 · US Department of State memorandum; FRUS 1947 V, doc. 810

30 Sep 1947 · Memorandum on the US position and changes to the UNSCOP proposal. This document was examined, not the complete original UNSCOP report volume.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d810

S13 · UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II): Partition with Economic Union

29 Nov 1947 · Transcription of the resolution, including the plan, minority rights, economic union and Jerusalem regime. Not evidence that the recommended order came into existence in that form.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/res181.asp

S14 · President Truman: Statement on Trusteeship for Palestine

25 Mar 1948 · Available statement on temporary trusteeship. Its date is essential when compared with recognition in May.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad167.asp

S15 · Plan Dalet (Plan D), translated general text

10 Mar 1948 · English translation of the plan’s general part with editorial notes. The web edition does not include the complete operational Appendix C; not all field orders or the Hebrew autograph were examined.

https://jewishvirtuallibrary.org/plan-dalet-for-war-of-independence-march-1948

Access to the listed web editions: 11 October 2026. Identifying a source does not independently confirm every sentence in it.

Source register / S16–S20

S16 · Consul General Wasson to the Secretary of State; FRUS 1948 V/2, doc. 145

13 Apr 1948 · Telegram concerning Deir Yassin. It relays a death toll rather than a name-by-name audit; the study retains it as a contemporaneously reported figure.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v05p2/d145

S17 · Nadine Picaudou: The Historiography of the 1948 Wars

1 Nov 2008 · Scholarly historiographical review at Sciences Po. Used to compare interpretations of displacement and archival research; this does not imply direct reading of every monograph it discusses.

https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/historiography-1948-wars.html

S18 · Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel

14 May 1948 · Transcription of the declaration. Its authors' claims, equality pledge and operative declaration of statehood are distinguished from subsequent practice.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/israel.asp

S19 · Truman: Statement Announcing Recognition of the State of Israel

14 May 1948 · Short public statement of de facto recognition of the provisional government; primary text from the presidential library.

https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/100/statement-president-announcing-recognition-state-israel

S20 · CIA, ORE 38–48: Possible Developments From the Palestine Truce; FRUS doc. 486

27 Jul 1948 · Contemporary intelligence estimate including enclosures. Reported conditions, forecasts and US assessments of Soviet intentions are distinguished.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v05p2/d486

Access to the listed web editions: 11 October 2026. Identifying a source does not independently confirm every sentence in it.

Source register / S21–S25

S21 · Rockwell memorandum of conversation; FRUS 1948 V/2, doc. 832

14 Dec 1948 · US record of a conversation with Israeli representatives, including acknowledgement of Czechoslovak arms purchases. Participants’ claims about other actors are not automatically independently established.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v05p2/d832

S22 · Burdett transmitting Ethridge, Palun 57; FRUS 1949 VI, doc. 494

28 Feb 1949 · Diplomatic assessment of the refugee question with a contemporary estimate of 700,000 people. The number, causal account and author’s moral judgement have different evidentiary status.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v06/d494

S23 · Catherine Rey-Schyrr: Le CICR et l’assistance aux réfugiés arabes palestiniens (1948–1950)

2001 · Article in International Review of the Red Cross 83/843, pp. 739–762. Especially the opening and reproduced nurses’ reports on Ramallah and Gaza; the archival originals were not personally examined.

https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/external/doc/fr/assets/files/other/irrc_843_001_rey-schyrr.pdf

S24 · UN Mediator Folke Bernadotte: Progress Report, selected conclusions

16 Sep 1948 · Extracts from report A/648, not the mission’s entire file. Proposed boundaries and refugee return are distinguished from an adopted settlement.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad170.asp

S25 · UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III)

11 Dec 1948 · Resolution text, especially paragraph 11 on return, compensation and the Conciliation Commission. Not a comprehensive opinion on every present-day legal dispute.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad171.asp

Access to the listed web editions: 11 October 2026. Identifying a source does not independently confirm every sentence in it.

Source register / S26–S30

S26 · Ethridge from Lausanne; FRUS 1949 VI, doc. 681

23 May 1949 · Record of negotiations and requests for return. A delegation’s request is distinguished from an agreement actually reached.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v06/d681

S27 · Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement

24 Feb 1949 · Agreement text, especially Articles IV–VI. Its explicit distinction between an armistice and a final political or territorial boundary.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arm01.asp

S28 · Jordanian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement

3 Apr 1949 · Agreement text, especially Article VI and the Jerusalem provisions. Neither a present-day map nor a peace treaty.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arm03.asp

S29 · Acting UN Mediator Ralph Bunche: Report, conclusions

21 Jul 1949 · Extract of the report’s conclusions after the armistices. Ending military operations is not equated with resolution of the political conflict.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad172.asp

S30 · UN General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV): Assistance to Palestine Refugees

8 Dec 1949 · Available transcription of provisions on assistance and establishment of UNRWA. Its relationship to paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 remains part of the interpretation.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad174.asp

Access to the listed web editions: 11 October 2026. Identifying a source does not independently confirm every sentence in it.

Source register / S31–S34

S31 · Absentees’ Property Law, 5710–1950

14 Mar 1950 · English translation of the historical statute, especially definitions, vesting in the Custodian and release provisions. Not a summary of current law or all later amendments.

https://www.jmcc.org/en/Article/104/Absentees%27-Property-Law-(1950)

S32 · Peter David Beter, Audio Letter 50, Topic 3

30 Sep 1979 · Available transcript, especially the connection drawn between Khazars, Zionism and 1917/1948. The transcript documents Beter’s claim, not the truth of his historical explanation.

https://www.peterdavidbeter.com/docs/all/dbal50.html

S33 · Peter David Beter, Audio Letter 67, Topic 2

25 Aug 1981 · Selected transcript passages on American Jews, Israeli politics and the alleged axis. The recording was not newly audited for this edition.

https://www.peterdavidbeter.com/docs/all/dbal67.html

S34 · Palestine: Military Situation, 6 April 1949, Truman Papers

6 Apr 1949 · Visually inspected digital reproduction of a US government map and its legend, hosted by Wikimedia Commons. The map is not reproduced in our files. A reference link is supplied, not a fabricated facsimile.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Palestine_Military_Situation,_April_6,_1949,_Truman_Papers.jpg

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