RA14

THE “NEW KREMLIN RULERS”

Beter’s “spiritual Communists,” Soviet succession, religion, military space and the Andropov test

COMPLETE SOURCE-BASED STUDY

A forensic study of the faction Beter said displaced the old Kremlin “Bolsheviks,” including de-Stalinization, religious repression, Andropov, Ustinov, Gorshkov and Soviet military-space secrecy.

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What Beter meant by the “New Kremlin”

Beter’s “New Kremlin Rulers” are not simply the historical Politburo after a normal leadership change. In Audio Letter 38 he proposes an internal Russian faction he calls “spiritual Communists,” says it displaced an older group he labels “Bolsheviks,” and interprets major Soviet developments as stages of that hidden transfer of power.

RA14 therefore separates three layers: the documented Soviet state and party leadership; Beter’s faction labels and causal narrative; and independently documented phenomena that may look superficially compatible with parts of the story, such as de-Stalinization, religious survival, leadership succession and military-space secrecy.

The central question is not whether the Soviet system changed — it did — but whether the changes are evidence of the specific hidden faction Beter described. Similarity between an event and a narrative is not enough. The mechanism and actors must be independently identified.

Documented change is not automatically evidence for Beter’s hidden actor.

Sources: S01, S02; independent comparison S03–S18.

Method: the claim must survive translation into testable parts

The phrase “New Kremlin” is too broad to test as one proposition. RA14 breaks it into dated subclaims: a secret religiously inflected faction existed; it gained leverage during de-Stalinization; it removed Beter’s “Bolsheviks” from key institutions; military and security leaders belonged to it; and later public succession reflected its internal decisions.

Each subclaim is compared with period-compatible evidence. Public chronology can establish who held formal office. Archival and human-rights records can describe religious policy. Military histories can confirm secret programs that later became known. But none of these sources should be made to say more than they establish.

Evidence categories are the same as in the RA series: supported; supported only in a narrower form; unresolved; or contradicted. A correct forecast is credited even if the attached hidden explanation is unsupported. A demonstrably false chronology is counted against the claim even if another part was accurate.

Separate outcome from mechanism and office from hidden allegiance.

Method applied to S01–S18.

AL38: the “spiritual Communists” claim

Audio Letter 38 is the core primary source for the theory. Beter describes a native Russian religious current, uses the term “spiritual Communists,” and claims this group had gained the upper hand inside the Soviet system while older “Bolshevik” elements were being removed from the Kremlin and military hierarchy.

The terminology is Beter’s. It is not a standard category in mainstream Soviet political history. That does not make the category impossible, but it means the analyst must avoid smuggling it into independent sources. A Soviet official being Russian, religious, anti-Stalinist or hostile to a rival is not sufficient to classify him as a member of Beter’s hidden faction.

The strongest possible verification would be an independent source identifying a self-conscious group with comparable membership, beliefs and strategy. The consulted material does not provide that. What it does provide is a complex history of religious repression, survival and changing state tactics.

The label itself is a claim; do not treat it as an independently established category.

Source: S01; independent religious context S03, S04, S18.

Religion in the USSR: repression and survival coexisted

Library of Congress archival material documents severe Soviet anti-religious campaigns: confiscation of church property, harassment, closures, execution or imprisonment of clergy, and state promotion of atheism. It also records later changes, including Stalin's wartime revival of the Russian Orthodox Church for patriotic purposes and renewed restrictions under Khrushchev.

This history matters because two simplistic claims are both wrong. It is inaccurate to say religion simply vanished from the USSR; organized worship and believers survived. It is equally inaccurate to infer from that survival that religious believers secretly controlled the Soviet state. Survival under repression is not evidence of command over the repressing institutions.

Beter's theory uses religious continuity as part of a hidden-power explanation. RA14 treats continuity as a documented social fact and the hidden-control inference as a separate proposition that still requires evidence of actors, organization and authority.

Religious survival is documented; religious control of the Kremlin is not thereby established.

Sources: S03, S18.

Article 52: constitutional language versus lived practice

The 1977 Soviet Constitution’s Article 52 formally guaranteed freedom of conscience, the right to profess or not profess religion, religious worship or atheistic propaganda, and separation of church and state. The text is useful because it establishes the legal language the Soviet system publicly claimed.

Human-rights reporting from the period shows why constitutional text cannot be treated as a complete account of practice. Amnesty International noted legal and administrative restrictions on religious activity and the asymmetry between protected atheistic propaganda and limits on religious teaching and organization.

For RA14, the gap between law and practice cuts in two directions. It confirms that Soviet religion cannot be understood by official ideology alone. But the existence of a gap does not automatically validate a hidden Christian governing faction. It shows that formal declarations, administrative practice and private belief must be researched separately.

Official atheism, legal guarantees and religious practice were not the same layer.

Sources: S04, S18.

1956 de-Stalinization: a real break, not self-identifying evidence

Khrushchev's 1956 secret speech denounced Stalin's purges and initiated a major process of de-Stalinization. This was an authentic rupture in Soviet political culture and leadership practice. Beter later interprets it as the first visible phase of a hidden transfer toward his "spiritual Communists."

The historical event is therefore compatible with one element of Beter's chronology: a visible change did occur. But compatibility is weaker than identification. The State Department's historical account explains the speech through party politics, post-Stalin leadership struggles, reform incentives and Khrushchev's own position, without identifying Beter's secret faction.

To establish Beter's mechanism, one would need evidence that the actors directing de-Stalinization belonged to the alleged religious network and pursued the program for the motives Beter assigns. RA14 did not find such independent documentation in the sources consulted.

De-Stalinization is documented; Beter's hidden authorship of it is not established.

Sources: S01, S05.

1976–1977: Beter’s alleged internal overthrow

Beter places a decisive internal transformation in the mid-1970s, claiming that the older faction was removed from effective Kremlin control and from the upper military hierarchy. The proposition is stronger than ordinary turnover. It alleges a hidden purge of allegiance rather than just changes in officeholders.

Public records do show major appointments during this period. Dmitriy Ustinov became Minister of Defense in April 1976. Long-serving Admiral Sergei Gorshkov remained at the head of the Soviet Navy. Andropov remained a central security figure. But holding office does not reveal the private factional identity Beter assigns.

The consulted sources do not independently document a 1976–1977 purge matching Beter’s categories. The claim therefore remains unresolved rather than converted into fact by the coincidence of personnel changes.

Personnel turnover is observable; hidden allegiance is not.

Sources: S01, S10, S11.

Dmitriy Ustinov: real office, disputed hidden role

Dmitriy Ustinov's appointment as Soviet Minister of Defense on 29 April 1976 is documented. His career at the intersection of armaments, industry and party leadership made him a genuinely important actor in Soviet military policy.

Beter later assigns Ustinov a role in the hidden succession after the 'real' Brezhnev's alleged death. That claim is not established by the appointment itself. A defense minister can become more influential as a leader weakens without secretly replacing the head of the Soviet state.

The test again requires contemporaneous records of decision authority: who chaired meetings, issued instructions, controlled appointments and represented the leadership internally. The public record supports Ustinov's high status; it does not, in the consulted material, support Beter's specific hidden-ruler sequence.

High office is evidence of influence, not proof of an unannounced succession.

Sources: S02, S10.

Sergei Gorshkov: naval power and Beter’s succession sequence

U.S. Naval History identifies Admiral Sergei Gorshkov as the leader of the Soviet Navy from 1956 to 1985. His tenure coincided with the USSR’s expansion into a far more capable blue-water navy. This makes him a major military figure independently of Beter’s story.

In AL80 Beter says that after Ustinov, Gorshkov held the reins of top power for a time. The public historical record does not identify Gorshkov as General Secretary, head of state or publicly supreme Soviet leader. The claim is therefore explicitly about hidden authority.

Hidden authority is possible in principle, but it is not established by naval prominence. Evidence would need to show that Gorshkov exercised cross-government decision authority beyond his formal military role. RA14 found no independent confirmation of that proposition in the consulted sources.

Prominence inside one institution does not prove supreme authority over the whole state.

Sources: S02, S11.

Andropov before November 1982: the public record matters

Yuri Andropov was not an unknown figure before Beter named him in AL80. He had led the KGB for fifteen years, sat in the Politburo and in May 1982 moved into the Party Secretariat. A UPI report of 30 May 1982 said he was widely regarded as the No. 1 candidate to succeed Brezhnev.

This context does not erase the significance of Beter's 3 November statement. It changes the baseline probability. Predicting a candidate already publicly described as the leading contender is different from naming a previously obscure person with no visible route to power.

A fair assessment must therefore credit the result while calibrating its evidentiary weight. The forecast matched the eventual succession, but publicly available information months earlier provided a conventional basis for making the same forecast.

The Andropov call is a real match, but not a low-probability miracle.

Sources: S02, S06.

3–12 November 1982: the Andropov outcome test

AL80 is dated 3 November 1982. In it Beter says that Yuri Andropov is becoming the new top Soviet leader and urges listeners to watch his name. Brezhnev died on 10 November, and the Central Committee selected Andropov as General Secretary on 12 November. The temporal sequence is genuine.

RA14 therefore records the outcome as a documented match. This should not be minimized merely because other Beter claims are controversial. Symmetric evaluation means giving a correct dated forecast its proper weight.

The match proves only the outcome proposition: Andropov soon became party leader. It does not independently prove Beter's additional claims about a hidden religious faction, a prior secret succession, Brezhnev doubles, space weapons or the motives of the new leadership. Each mechanism remains separately testable.

Outcome: matched. Hidden mechanism: still unproven.

Sources: S02, S07, S08, S09.

Brezhnev: Beter’s 1978 death claim versus the public chronology

The same AL80 passage that correctly points to Andropov also states that the ‘real’ Leonid Brezhnev died on 7 January 1978 and that public appearances afterward were performed by doubles. This is a much more demanding claim because it contradicts the standard chronology by nearly five years.

Contemporary reporting and later official historical documents place Brezhnev’s death on 10 November 1982. They record speeches, meetings, public appearances and a final medical account across the intervening years. A replacement hypothesis is logically possible but needs extraordinary affirmative evidence because it must explain the sustained public and institutional record.

The consulted sources do not provide such evidence. RA14 therefore treats the 1978 death/doubles claim as contradicted by the available chronology, while keeping the Andropov succession forecast as a separate successful outcome. One paragraph can contain both a hit and a major conflict with evidence.

A successful forecast does not immunize adjacent claims from contradiction.

Sources: S02, S07–S09.

Billy Graham in Moscow, May 1982: visibility without proof of control

Billy Graham's May 1982 visit to Moscow is useful because it prevents a caricature of Soviet religious life. Contemporary reporting documents public worship and conversations with church leaders. Graham said he had been able to speak freely, while critics stressed continuing restrictions and prisoners connected with religious activity.

The event therefore supports a nuanced conclusion: religion was visible and organized in the USSR, yet it operated inside a system that retained legal and administrative controls. This is compatible with religious survival, not automatically with a Christian takeover of the Soviet command structure.

For Beter's theory the decisive missing link remains organizational. A public religious event can show that believers existed and could sometimes operate openly. It does not identify the alleged secret sect, its membership, its command channels or its power over the Politburo, KGB and armed forces.

Religious visibility is evidence of survival; it is not evidence of hidden state command.

Sources: S16–S18.

Military-space secrecy was real: the Almaz case

The Soviet Union did operate a secret military space-station program. NASA's historical accounts distinguish the military Almaz stations from the civilian Salyut program and identify Salyut 3 and Salyut 5 as Almaz vehicles used for military reconnaissance-related purposes.

This fact is important because it establishes a general premise often missed in retrospective debate: public Soviet program names did not always reveal the full military purpose of the hardware. Classified programs and deliberate cover arrangements existed.

But a verified instance of secrecy does not validate every additional secret-space allegation. The evidentiary value is bounded. Almaz supports the statement 'the USSR concealed some military space capabilities'; it does not by itself support a Moon base, Cosmospheres, orbital battles or a hidden faction's control of those systems.

A real secret program proves secrecy existed, not that every secret-space claim is true.

Sources: S12, S13.

From Almaz to Cosmospheres: the evidentiary gap

Beter's New Kremlin story is tied to extraordinary military-space capabilities: hovering spherical platforms, armed orbital systems, a lunar installation and engagements beyond publicly acknowledged programs. These are much more specific claims than the existence of classified reconnaissance stations.

To bridge the gap, evidence would need to identify hardware, launch or logistics records, tracking observations, engineering constraints, personnel or independently preserved documents matching the claimed systems. Merely pointing to a culture of secrecy cannot supply those missing particulars.

The discipline is the same used elsewhere in the RA series: a verified cover story raises the prior plausibility that other secrets may exist, but it does not select one proposed secret from all alternatives. Specific claims require specific evidence.

Secrecy is context. Hardware, records and independent observations are verification.

Sources: S01, S12, S13.

Tunguska: a dramatic event does not identify the proposed cause

Beter connects the 1908 Tunguska explosion with an extraterrestrial craft and the long-range ambitions of the rulers he describes. The explosion itself is unquestionably real; the disputed element is its cause.

NASA's modern account treats Tunguska as an atmospheric explosion caused by a cosmic object, consistent with the devastation pattern and current near-Earth-object science. That explanation does not prove that every historical uncertainty is closed, but it provides a conventional mechanism supported by physical evidence.

A spacecraft explanation would require discriminating evidence — material remains, instrumentation, documented technology or observations that favor an artificial craft over an asteroid or cometary body. RA14 found no such independent evidence in the source set. The existence of an unexplained-looking historical event is not enough to identify Beter's preferred mechanism.

Real event: yes. Beter's proposed artificial cause: not independently established.

Sources: S01, S15.

Venus: strategic speculation meets a hostile physical environment

AL38 extends the rulers' long-range ambitions beyond Earth and names Venus in a future colonization vision. The value of this passage for RA14 is not that it supplies a near-term prediction, but that it shows how far Beter's faction model expands from Soviet politics into a technological-civilizational program.

Modern planetary data establish an extreme surface environment: roughly 92 bar of pressure and an average surface temperature around 737 K, about 464 °C. Those conditions do not make every conceivable future exploration impossible, but they impose severe engineering constraints on any settlement claim.

No source consulted for RA14 independently links the Soviet leadership to a secret Venus settlement program. The passage is therefore classified as speculative programmatic content within Beter's narrative, not as a verified component of Soviet policy.

Planetary facts can test feasibility; they do not create evidence for a secret program.

Sources: S01, S14.

An evidence ladder for extraordinary military-space claims

Extraordinary capabilities should be evaluated with an evidence ladder rather than a binary ‘believe/disbelieve’ test. Level one is a claim in the Audio Letters. Level two is compatibility with known physics and historical capability. Level three is independent observation or documentary trace. Level four is convergent evidence from unrelated sources.

Almaz reaches the documentary and hardware levels for a specific Soviet military-space program. Beter’s more extraordinary systems do not reach the same level in the consulted corpus. The correct conclusion is not that secrecy is impossible, but that evidentiary maturity differs sharply between claims.

This ladder also prevents reverse contamination. A verified secret station should not automatically promote an unrelated claim about lunar weapons. Each system must climb the ladder on its own evidence.

Do not let one verified secret program certify a different extraordinary system.

Applied to S01, S02, S12–S15.

Formal succession and hidden faction membership are different questions

The Soviet succession record is unusually useful because it supplies dates, offices and named actors. Brezhnev's death, Andropov's selection and high offices held by Ustinov and Gorshkov can all be placed on a public timeline.

Beter's theory adds another variable — hidden faction membership. That attribute cannot be inferred simply because the same person appears in the public chronology. A defense minister becoming influential proves influence; a KGB chief becoming General Secretary proves succession; neither fact identifies a secret religious allegiance without separate evidence.

RA14 therefore keeps a two-column mental model throughout: what happened publicly, and what hidden interpretation Beter assigns to it. Agreement in the first column does not automatically verify the second.

Office can be verified directly; hidden allegiance needs its own evidence.

Sources: S02, S06–S11.

Prediction calibration: why the Andropov case is still valuable

A disciplined analysis should neither inflate nor dismiss the Andropov result. Beter's AL80 was dated before Brezhnev's death and explicitly named Andropov, who soon became General Secretary. That is a genuine dated success at the outcome level.

The same result becomes less probative of privileged secret access when contemporary reporting is added: Andropov had already been described months earlier as the leading succession candidate. The test therefore shifts from 'Did Beter name the winner?' to 'Did he possess information unavailable through ordinary political analysis?'

RA14 cannot establish the latter from the consulted sources. The case remains useful precisely because it demonstrates calibration: a hit can be real and still carry limited weight for a much larger hidden-government theory.

Credit the hit; calibrate what it actually proves.

Sources: S02, S06–S09.

Claim register: propositions supported in a narrower form

Several propositions underneath Beter's narrative are independently supported in narrower form. The Soviet Union underwent major leadership and ideological changes after Stalin. De-Stalinization was real. Religious life survived despite intense repression. Ustinov, Gorshkov and Andropov were genuinely powerful figures. Soviet military-space secrecy, including Almaz, was real.

These findings matter because a careful audit should preserve true background conditions even when it rejects an unsupported inference. They make the historical environment more complex than a simple official-versus-conspiracy binary.

What they do not establish is the connective tissue Beter supplies: one old Christian sect coordinating the changes, expelling a distinct hidden 'Bolshevik' faction and controlling the extraordinary weapons and long-range program attributed to the New Kremlin.

The background is often real; the hidden unifying mechanism remains the hard part.

Sources: S03, S05, S10–S13, S16–S18.

Claim register: unresolved propositions

The central unresolved proposition is organizational: did a self-conscious, long-lived Christian or ‘spiritual Communist’ network actually coordinate the Soviet leadership transition described by Beter? The consulted source set does not identify such an organization with membership records, doctrine, meetings or internal documents.

Related unresolved claims include hidden membership of named officials, the proposed sequence of real power behind the formal offices, and the operational connection between that faction and extraordinary military-space systems. Absence of accessible evidence is not mathematical proof of nonexistence, especially in a secretive state.

But unresolved status has a discipline of its own. A claim remains unresolved only when it is not contradicted by stronger evidence; it does not become provisionally true because relevant archives may be incomplete. The evidentiary burden stays with the specific proposition.

Unresolved is a status of evidence, not a synonym for “probably true.”

Assessment across S01–S18.

Claim register: propositions contradicted by the available chronology

The clearest conflict is Beter's assertion that the real Brezhnev died on 7 January 1978 and that later appearances were doubles. The consulted contemporary and official historical records place his death on 10 November 1982 and maintain a continuous public and institutional chronology to that point.

A replacement theory could only survive that conflict by supplying affirmative evidence strong enough to overturn the conventional record. RA14 found no such evidence in the reviewed materials. The claim is therefore not merely 'unverified'; it is contradicted by the available chronology.

This classification matters because the same AL80 also contains the correct Andropov forecast. Treating the entire passage as either vindicated or discredited would lose information. Claim-level scoring preserves both facts.

The 1978 Brezhnev-death/doubles claim is the strongest chronological contradiction in RA14.

Sources: S02, S07–S09.

Chronology: 1953–1982

1953: Stalin dies, beginning a succession struggle. 1956: Khrushchev's Twentieth Party Congress and secret speech become a major de-Stalinization milestone. 1976: Ustinov becomes Minister of Defense. 1976–1977: Beter places the decisive hidden overthrow of his 'Bolsheviks' in this period.

1978: AL38 systematizes the 'spiritual Communists' account. Beter also claims that the real Brezhnev died in January 1978, a chronology contradicted by the standard record. 1982: Andropov moves from the KGB into the Party Secretariat; contemporary reporting identifies him as a leading successor candidate.

3 November 1982: AL80 names Andropov. 10 November: Brezhnev dies according to the public record. 12 November: Andropov is selected General Secretary. 15 November: a U.S. diplomatic record shows him functioning in that office. The timeline contains both a Beter match and a Beter contradiction.

A chronology is most useful when it preserves both confirmations and conflicts.

Sources: S01, S02, S05–S11.

What would materially strengthen the hidden-faction hypothesis?

The most valuable evidence would be contemporaneous, independently authenticated material that names the organization Beter described: internal memoranda, membership records, correspondence, meeting minutes, diaries, intelligence reporting with identifiable provenance, or multiple independent witnesses whose accounts converge before publication of the Audio Letters.

For the leadership sequence, records would need to show actual cross-government decision authority by the named hidden rulers beyond their formal offices. For the military-space component, hardware records, telemetry, launch manifests, tracking data or engineering documentation would be materially probative.

Strong evidence should also discriminate between explanations. A document saying that Ustinov was influential is weak because all models expect that. A document showing a defined secret group selecting public leaders for religious-strategic reasons would specifically favor Beter's model.

The best evidence is evidence that competing explanations would not predict equally well.

Research procedure derived from the claim structure in S01–S18.

Falsifiability: what should count against the model?

A hidden-power theory becomes analytically weak if every possible outcome is interpreted as confirmation. If a named official rises, the faction succeeded; if he falls, the faction hid him; if records agree, they confirm the story; if records disagree, they are said to be cover. Such a structure can absorb evidence without being tested by it.

RA14 therefore defines disconfirming conditions in advance. Directly incompatible dated records count against a claim unless independent evidence supports a cover mechanism. Failed predictions count against the relevant prediction. Long-term absence of the specific organizational traces that the theory predicts reduces confidence, though it does not logically prove nonexistence.

This rule is applied symmetrically: the Andropov match counts for Beter; the Brezhnev chronology counts against the doubles claim. The resulting picture is less dramatic but more informative.

A testable model must be able to lose.

Editorial method; examples S02, S06–S09.

Overall assessment

RA14 finds a historically real environment that can make Beter's account superficially plausible in places: Soviet power struggles, de-Stalinization, survival of religious life, opaque elite politics, major military figures and genuine classified military-space programs. Those facts deserve to remain visible.

The stronger proposition — that a centuries-old Christian 'spiritual Communist' sect seized the Kremlin, expelled a distinct hidden 'Bolshevik' faction, controlled a secret succession and commanded extraordinary space systems — is not established by the consulted independent evidence. The organizational bridge is missing, and some attached claims conflict with the public chronology.

The most interesting positive case is Beter's dated identification of Andropov immediately before the succession. It is a real match, but its evidentiary weight is limited by the fact that Andropov was already a publicly discussed leading candidate. The strongest negative case is the claim that Brezhnev had died in 1978 and was replaced by doubles. RA14 therefore closes with a mixed but calibrated verdict: real context and one notable forecast; hidden-faction mechanism unproven; major chronology claim contradicted.

Real Soviet secrecy and change: supported. Beter's specific hidden-faction mechanism: not established. Andropov outcome: matched. Brezhnev-1978/doubles claim: contradicted.

Assessment based on S01–S18; source-access cut-off 13 Oct 2026.

Source register · 1

S01 — Peter D. Beter — Audio Letter 38 · 29 Sep 1978
Primary transcript for the “spiritual Communists,” alleged purge of Bolsheviks and the three-phase “holy war” model.
https://www.peterdavidbeter.com/docs/all/dbal38.html

S02 — Peter D. Beter — Audio Letter 80 · 3 Nov 1982
Primary transcript for Beter’s changing-of-the-guard narrative, Brezhnev-double claim and identification of Yuri Andropov.
https://www.peterdavidbeter.com/docs/all/dbal80.html

S03 — Library of Congress — Revelations from the Russian Archives: Anti-religious campaigns
Archival overview of Soviet anti-religious policy, church closures, persecution and later wartime accommodation.
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/intn.html

S04 — USSR Constitution (1977) — Article 52, UN Digital Library extract
Text of Article 52 guaranteeing freedom of conscience, worship or atheistic propaganda, with church and state separated.
https://digitallibrary.un.org/nanna/record/121492/files/E_CN.4_1986_37-EN.pdf?registerDownload=1&version=1&withMetadata=0&withWatermark=0

S05 — U.S. State Department — Khrushchev and the Twentieth Party Congress, 1956
Historical overview of the secret speech, de-Stalinization and political consequences.
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/khrushchev-20th-congress

S06 — UPI — Ex-KGB chief gains in jockeying for Brezhnev post · 30 May 1982
Contemporary report stating months before AL80 that Andropov was widely regarded as the No. 1 candidate to succeed Brezhnev.
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/05/30/Ex-KGB-chief-gains-in-jockeying-for-Brezhnev-post/5442391579200/

S07 — U.S. State Department FRUS — Andropov selected General Secretary · 12 Nov 1982
Official historical-document footnote: Andropov was selected on 12 Nov 1982, two days after Brezhnev’s death.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v11/d44

S08 — U.S. State Department FRUS — Bush–Andropov meeting · 15 Nov 1982
Contemporary diplomatic record identifying Andropov as General Secretary and recording the transition after Brezhnev’s death.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v03/d234

Source register · 2

S09 — UPI — Brezhnev death report · 11 Nov 1982
Contemporary report of Brezhnev's death on 10 Nov 1982 and the official medical account.
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/11/11/President-Leonid-Brezhnev-who-forged-detente-with-the-West/4406405838800/

S10 — CIA Reading Room — Soviet military leadership table
Document noting Dmitriy Ustinov's appointment as Minister of Defense on 29 Apr 1976.
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000501584.pdf

S11 — U.S. Naval History — Ready Seapower
Naval history identifying Admiral Sergei Gorshkov as leader of the Soviet Navy from 1956 to 1985.
https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/publications/Publication-PDF/ReadySeapower.pdf

S12 — NASA — 50 Years Ago: Launch of Salyut
NASA history confirming the secret Soviet Almaz military space-station project and its relationship to Salyut hardware.
https://www.nasa.gov/missions/station/50-years-ago-launch-of-salyut-the-worlds-first-space-station/

S13 — NASA — History's Highest Stage
History distinguishing civilian Salyut and military Almaz stations and describing military surveillance activity.
https://www.nasa.gov/history/SP-4225/hhs/hhs.htm

S14 — NASA NSSDC — Venus Fact Sheet
Reference values for Venus surface pressure (~92 bar) and average surface temperature (~737 K / 464°C).
https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/factsheet/venusfact.html

S15 — NASA — A Cosmic Explosion Over Siberia (Tunguska)
Modern NASA account of the 1908 Tunguska airburst and near-Earth-object explanation.
https://science.nasa.gov/earth/earth-observatory/a-cosmic-explosion-over-siberia-154488/

S16 — Christian Science Monitor — Billy Graham preaches from Moscow pulpit · 10 May 1982
Contemporary evidence that organized religious worship existed in Moscow while remaining embedded in a restrictive Soviet system.
https://www.csmonitor.com/1982/0510/051016.html

Source register · 3

S17 — Washington Post — Graham says Soviets did not curb talks · 12 May 1982
Contemporary report showing the complexity and controversy of assessing Soviet religious freedom during Graham's visit.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/05/13/graham-says-soviets-didnt-curb-talks/c18ffe61-eba7-405f-a705-eced0599de32/

S18 — Amnesty International — Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR (1980)
Contemporary human-rights analysis of Soviet religious law and restrictions, including Article 52.
https://www.amnesty.org/es/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/eur460041980eng.pdf